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ABSTRACT
WAGE IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT WITH SALARY ADJUSTMENT
PROCESS
O¨ZCAN, Elif
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Tarık Kara
September 2012
The main objective of this thesis is to analyse theoretically the implications
of increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) on the wages of workers and on
the profits of firms in the local country which is previously studied in Saglam
and Sayek (2011). In this study, we modify the Kelso and Crawford’s salary
adjustment process. Firstly, capacity constraint of firms is introduced into
the Kelso and Crawford’s salary adjustment process. Secondly, we study the
process where workers make offers. Existence of stable matching is explored.
In the process where firms offer, the matching converges to a stable matching
but in the process where workers offer, stability may not hold.
While analysing the implications of increasing FDI on the wages and on
the profits in the local country, we use the firm-proposing salary adjustment
process with capacity constraint. Our analysis shows that under certain as-
sumptions workers and foreign firms benefit from increasing presence of for-
eign direct investment while domestic firms may lose profits.




DOG˘RUDAN YABANCI YATIRIMLARIN MAAS¸
BELI˙RLEME ALGORI˙TMASI I˙LE MAAS¸LAR
U¨ZERI˙NE ETKI˙SI˙
O¨ZCAN, Elif
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yard. Doc¸. Dr. Tarık Kara
Eylu¨l 2012
Bu tezin ana amacı, daha o¨nce Saglam ve Sayek (2011)’de calıs¸ılmıs¸ olan,
artan dog˘rudan yabancı yatırım aktivitelerinin is¸c¸i maas¸larına ve firma kar-
larına olan etkisi teorik olarak incelemektir. Bu c¸alıs¸mada, Kelso ve Craw-
ford (1982)’ın maas¸ belirleme algoritması modifiye edilmektedir. I˙lk olarak,
Kelso ve Crawford (1982)’ın maas¸ belirleme algoritmasına firmaların kapasite
kısıtları tanıtılmaktadır. I˙kinci olarak, c¸alıs¸anların teklif yaptıgı algoritma
c¸alıs¸ılmaktadır. Bu algoritmaların kararlı dengelerinin varlıg˘ı incelenmekte-
dir. Firmaların teklif yaptıgı algoritmada, kararlı bir es¸les¸meye ulas¸ılmaktadır
ancak is¸c¸ilerin teklif yaptıgı algoritmada kararlılık sag˘lanmayabilir.
Artan dog˘rudan yabancı yatırım aktivitelerinin maas¸larına ve karlarına
olan etkisini incelerken, kapasite kısıtlı firma-teklifli maas¸ belirleme algo-
ritması kullanılmaktadır. Bizim analizimiz, bazı varsayımlar altında artan
dog˘rudan yabancı yatırımların varlıg˘ ından c¸alıs¸anların ve yabancı firmaların
yarar sag˘ladıg˘ını ancak yerli firmaların kar kaybedebileceg˘ini go¨stermektedir.
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International economic integration, or globalization, is generally regarded
as one of the main forces that determine the economic well-being. Since
trade, investment and worker flows have a substantial economic impact on
labour market, labor market analysis is indisputable in this content. Conse-
quently, it has been extensively studied by economists who have concentrated
on globalization.
One particular focus of this topic is foreign direct investment (FDI) through
which transfer of technology across countries can take place. Since techno-
logical progress plays a key role in economic development, growth rates of
a country can be partially explained by a catch-up process in the level of
technology. It is also important to make sure that FDI induces a rise in pros-
perity due to its essential impacts on welfare. The employment opportunities
created by foreign owned firms and the higher wages they are able to pay
are some of such impacts. However, FDI is not sufficient alone. The missing
factor can be complemented with absorptive capability in the local country.
In other words, there must be some workers that are capable of using new
technology.
Fair distribution of benefits from FDI and its effects on domestic firms
are big concerns. It is widely known that FDI affects the wages of workers
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in a positive way in the local country. However, there is a controversy on
whether increasing FDI activities affect domestic firms in a good way or
not. Since foreign firms experience more advanced technological progress and
management practices than local firms, foreign firms generally have higher
level of productivity. Hence, when foreign firms enter the local market, they
bring these experiences along with them that causes an increase in the level
of domestic firms’ productivity. On the other hand, the presence of foreign
firms may make domestic firms suffer from the increasing competition. Even,
they may reduce their output and lose profits.
In this study we will observe the implications of FDI on salaries of workers
and the profits of firms. These questions have already been studied in several
publications. Our contribution will be using different matching mechanism
of firms and workers with a discrete time model. In order to achieve our goal,
a discrete time labour search model with infinitely lived and risk neutral
workers will be built. Kelso and Crawford (1982)’s salary adjustment process
will be used to assign workers to firms and simultaneously determine the
wages. There will be some changes in the Kelso and Crawford (1982)’s process
like imposing capacity constraint which might yield unemployment. Then,
the implications of increasing multinational enterprises activities to wages of
workers and to wages of foreign and local firms will be analysed. Furthermore,
a worker proposing version of Kelso and Crawford’s salary adjustment process




FDI plays a key role in many economies, in particular in developing economies.
Therefore, FDI has taken considerable attention in international economics
research. In this section the theoretical framework of our central issue will
be given from the point of view of both international economics and microe-
conomic theory.
The positive effect of FDI on economic growth is widely accepted. The
role of FDI in economic growth in developing countries with a cross-country
regression framework is examined in Borensztein et al. (1998). Their results
show that the beneficial effects of FDI on economic growth come through tech-
nological progress rather than from higher capital accumulation. Blomstro¨m
and Sjo¨holm (1999) indicate that when multinational enterprises start to op-
erate in a foreign economy, they bring with them their special knowledge and
technology in order to compete with domestic firms that are accustomed to
the local country’s circumstances.
Nelson and Phelps (1966) emphasizes the roles of technological progress
and absorptive capability in the local country for economic growth. There
exists a technology gap between local and foreign firms. Glass and Saggi
(2002) construct and oligopoly model with this technology gap to see the
effect of technology transfer on wages of both domestic and foreign firms.
3
Another strand of the literature has focused on the effects of FDI presence
on wages of workers and profits of firms including the studies Aitken et al.
(1996), Barry et al. (2005), Saglam and Sayek (2011).
Aitken et al. (1996), analyzes the impacts of FDI on the wages of do-
mestic firms in three countries: Mexico, Venezuela and the US. Increasing
FDI activities lead to a raise in the wage of domestic firms in the US but
a reduction in Mexico and Venezuela. They find the following fact which is
valid for all three countries: higher level of FDI is relevant with higher level
of wages. A similar study is done by Barry et al. (2005). They look into
the role of FDI on wages and productivity of domestic firms in Ireland. The
difference of this study from existing ones is the presence of domestic export-
ing firms and domestic non-exporting firms. FDI has no effect in domestic
non-exporters but a negative effect on domestic exporters. That is to say,
absorptive capacity is needed in order to benefit from technology transfer.
Saglam and Sayek (2011) documents the wage implications of increasing
FDI activities. These activities cause a rise in the wages of workers that work
for foreign firms but a decrease in the wages of all workers that work for local
firms..
Another issue is how to assign workers to firms in the economy. This
matching problem has been extensively studied among economists. The start-
ing points of the analyses of the matching processes can be accepted as Gale
and Shapley(1962), Shapley and Shubik(1972), Crawford and Knoer(1981).
Gale and Shapley(1962) consider the matching problem in the markets like
the marriage market and student-college market where the preferences of
agents are exogenous. They use a ”deferred acceptance algorithm” to match
the agents and to show the existence of the core for both marriage problem
and college-admission problem. Shapley and Shubik(1972) also continue to
this research by introducing a divisible good, money, into the market. In
their framework, utility functions of agents are depend on money linearly
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which makes the utility function transferable. That means agents are able to
compensate each other in contrast to Gale and Shapley(1962).
Crawford and Knoer (1981) has a different approach to the problem of
Shapley and Shubik(1972). By considering the discreteness and divisibility of
money, they construct a new discrete time algorithm which is called ”salary
adjustment process” which is useful to study labor markets with heteroge-
neous firms and heterogeneous workers.
Kelso and Crawford (1982) also use the salary adjustment process, which
is one of the most realistic matching mechanism. This study demonstrates
that an equilibrium exists and it is stable in such markets under certain
circumstances. Intuitively, there does not exist any other matching in which
firms and all workers will be better off and at least one of the workers or firms
will be strictly better off.
While we are analysing the implications of increasing FDI activities on
local country’s economy, we will use Kelso and Crawfords the salary ad-
justment process. However, we have capacity constraint for each firm in our
model and so unemployment. First, the robustness of the usual salary adjust-
ment process results is checked. Then, we build a worker proposing version of
salary adjustment process in which capacity constraints remain in force. The
characteristics of the new matching process is also identified. We call this
new process as worker-proposing salary adjustment process and former one
as firm-proposing salary adjustment process. In most of the studies that use
labour search models, the matching depends on the probabilities and wages
are determined with a Nash bargaining solution. So, this matching process
is somewhat formed with coincidences. We will use the firm-proposing salary
adjustment process instead of the former ones in order to document the effects




There are workers and two types of firms -foreign (F ) and domestic (D).
The set of workers is W = {w1, . . . , wn} and the set of firms is F = {F,D}.
Each firm has capacity constraints (vacant positions -vF and vD) and each
worker is allowed to work for only one firm. We are considering a discrete
time model in which workers are infinitely lived and risk neutral. The w’s
utility of working for firm f at salary s is denoted by uw(swf ) that is assumed
to be strictly increasing and continous. Firm f ’s gross product is given by
the function yf : W −→ R. Firm f ’s profits from hiring the set of workers
W at salary sf = (swf )w∈W is given by pif (W, sf ) = yf (W )−
∑
w∈W swf . Our
matching problem can be described as (W ,F , µ, s).
We have the following four assumptions about about production technolo-
gies of firms and preferences of workers:
Let uw(0) denote the worker w’s valuation of being unemployed hence of
receiving no salary. Let σwf be defined by u
w(σwf ) = u
w(0). Thus, σwf is the
lowest salary at which worker w would ever consider for working for firm f .
Intiutively, σwf can be thought as the disutility of worker w from working for
firm f .
Our first assumption is ”marginal productivity”:
∀w ∈ W and ∀W ⊂ W with w /∈ W , ∀f ∈ F :
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yf (W ∪ {w})− yf (W )− σwf > 0.
Each worker’s marginal product is weakly greater than the lowest salary
that the worker would ever consider for working for each firm. Then, naturally
the firm would hire the worker at the lowest salary.
”No free lunch” is our second assumption:
∀f ∈ F , yf (∅) = 0
No free lunch assumption is a natural restriction which tells us that if
there is no worker there is no output.
Third, we require that all workers are ”gross substitutes” on the account
of each firm. For any f ∈ F , let M f (sf ) stand for the set of solutions that
maximizes the profit of firm f ,pif (W, sf ), subject to capacity constraint of f
where the maximum is taken over all possible sets of workers. Take any two
vectors of salaries sf and s˜f faced by firm f . Let T f (W ) = {w | w ∈ W and
s˜if = sif} Then we have:
∀f ∈ F , if W ∈M f (sf ) and s˜f > sf , then there exists W˜ ∈M f (s˜f ) such
that T f (W ) ⊆ W˜ .
Gross substitute assumption says that when some of workers’ salaries rise,
a firm can never withdraw an offer from a worker whose salary has not risen.
Finally, we will assume that foreign firm is more productive than domestic
firm with same set of workers:
∀W ∈ W , yF (W ) ≥ yD(W ).
Definition 1. A matching µ is a correspondence from F to W satisfying
(1) for any f ∈ F if µ−1(f) /∈ W ,then µ−1(f) = ∅
(2) for any w ∈ W , if µ(w) /∈ F , then µ(w) = ∅,
(3) for any (f, w) ∈ F ×W , µ(w) = f if and only if w ∈ µ−1(f)
(4) for any f ∈ F , |{w | µ(w) = f}| ≤ vf .
Definition 2. Let µ :W → F be the matching. The matching with a salary
schedule s is called individually rational if the followings are satisfied
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(1) uw(swµ(w)) ≥ uw(σwµ(w)),
(2) pif (µ−1(f), sf ) = yf (µ−1(f))−∑w∈µ−1(f) swf > 0.
If a worker w’s salary for working for firm f is less than his lowest salary
for working for firm f , then he may prefer being unemployed to working for
firm f . From the standpoint of firms, if a firm f ’s profit is less than zero,
then it may shut down the the production.
Definition 3. An individually rational matching µ with a salary schedule s
is called stable if there are no firm and set of workers pair (f ′,W ) satisfying
|W | ≤ vf ′ and (integer) salaries rf ′ that satisfy





) > pif ′(µ−1(f ′), sf ′), with strict inequality holding for at
least one member of W ∪ {f ′}.
If there exist a firm f ′ and a set of workers W such that each worker
in W gets higher salary and so higher utility from working for firm f ′ than
from working for the firm which he has been assigned and the firm f ′ gets
higher profit from hiring the set of workers W than from the set of workers
which it has hired, then since firms are profit maximizer and workers are
utility maximizer, firm f ′ and the workers in the set W may prefer working
together. Hence, (f ′,W ) pair blocks the matching.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF THE SALARY
ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
4.1 The Firm-Proposing Salary Adjustment
Process
In this section, we describe the firm-proposing salary adjustment process
which is a modification of Kelso and Crawford’s salary adjustment process.
We also check the robustness of Kelso and Crawford’s salary adjustment pro-
cess results. The difference between the firm-proposing salary adjustment
process and Kelso and Crawford’ salary adjustment process is imposing ca-
pacity constraint to firms and its natural result, unemployment. The firm-
proposing salary adjustment process is described by the following algorithm.
Step 1. In the very first step each firm faces a schedule of permitted
salaries swf (0) = σwf and permitted salaries at step t are given by swf (t).
Step 2. In each step, each firm makes offers to the members of one of
its profit maximizing sets of workers by taking into account the permitted
salaries. Formally, firm f makes offers to the workers of W f [sf (t)] where
W f [sf (t)] maximizes pif (W, sf (t)) subject to |W | ≤ vf . By gross substitute
assumption, it is required that if an offer made by firm f is not rejected in
step t− 1, it will be repeated again in step t.
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Step 3. Each worker must accept the offer which maximizes his utility but
reject the others. If he doesn’t receive any offer, he has nothing to do.
Step 4. If worker w rejected an offer from firm f in step t − 1, swf (t) =
swf (t − 1) + 1; otherwise swf (t) = swf (t − 1). Each firm keeps on making
offers to one of their profit-maximizing sets of workers given the salaries that
satisfy its capacity constraint by considering its permitted salaries.
Step 5. The process stops when there is no rejection.
Now, the result on the existence of a stable matching will be given. We
need some lemmas to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The firm-proposing salary adjustment process Step 1-Step 5
converges in finite time to a stable matching in the market for which it is
defined.
Lemma 1. After a finite number of steps, the firm-proposing salary adjust-
ment process stops.
Proof. If a worker has at least one offer at some period, he will not become
unemployed at the end of the process.
By Step 3, if he has multiple offers, then he must accept the best one but
rejects others. The permitted salaries of rejected firms must rise one. Since
for all firms f ∈ F and for all subsets of workers W ⊆ W yf (W ) is finite, he
eventually loses all but one offer.
If a worker doesn’t have any offer at any period, he will become unem-
ployed.
Lemma 2. The firm-proposing salary adjustment process converges to an
individually rational matching.
Proof. Let t∗ be the step at which the process stops and let µ and W fµ denote
the assignment to which it converges.
Claim. For any f ∈ F ∪ {∅} and for any w ∈ W with µ(w) = f :
uw(swf (t
∗)) ≥ uw(σwf )
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Case 1. f ∈ F
By Step 1 and Step 4 of the firm-proposing salary adjustment process,
swf (t
∗) ≥ σwf . Since u is strictly increasing, we have uw(swf (t∗)) ≥ uw(σwf )
Case 2. f = ∅
Since the worker is unemployed, then his salary will be zero. Formally,
swf (t
∗) = 0. Thus, uw(swf (t∗)) = uw(0) = uw(σwf ) which is the lowest utility
which the worker w would ever consider for working for firm f
Claim. For any f ∈ F : pif (W fµ , sf (t∗)) ≥ 0
Since no free lunch assumption implies pif (∅, sf (t∗)) = yf (∅) = 0, the claim
is the immediate result of Step 1 of the firm-proposing salary adjustment
process and the fact that the firm is not required to hire any workers.
Lemma 3. The firm-proposing salary adjustment process converges to a sta-
ble matching.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the process converges to a matching. For any f ∈ F and
for any w ∈ W , let µ−1(f) be the set of workers assigned to firm f by µ and
swµ(w) be the salary of w. By marginal productivity, if it hires less workers,
it does not maximize its profits. Hence, the firm will hire exactly vf -workers.
Assume that the matching is not stable. By Lemma 2, it is individual
rational. Thus, there must exist a firm-set of workers pair (f,W ) satisfying
|W | ≤ vf and salaries rf such that
(1) ∀w ∈ W : uw(rwf ) > uw(swµ(w))
(2) pif (W, rf ) > pif (µ−1(f), sf )
Consider the case µ(w) ∈ F . By (1) and Step 3 of the worker proposing
salary adjustment process, worker w must never have received an offer from
firm f at a salary rwf or greater. Since permitted salaries never fall, the
salaries sf must satisfy: ∀w ∈ W such that µ(w) ∈ F , swf ≤ rwf .
On the other hand consider the case µ(w) = ∅. Then, since the worker w
never have received an offer, swf = σwf . By (1), swf ≤ rwf .
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Hence, for any w ∈ W , swµ(w) ≤ rwf . Then,
pif (W, sf ) = yf (W )−∑w∈W swf
≥ yf (W )−∑w∈W rwf
> pif (µ−1(f), sf )
by (2) which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of our theorem.
4.2 The Worker-proposing Salary Adjustment
Process
This section describes the rules of worker-proposing salary adjustment process
and documents the characteristics of the process. Capacity constraint of firms
remains in force.
Step 1. In the very first step, each worker w specifies the highest salary
for each firm by solving the following maximization problem
δwf = maxW∈W−{w} yf (W ∪ w)− yf (W ).
Permitted salaries at step t are given by swf (t).
Step 2. In each step, each worker w makes offer to one of the firms that
maximize his utility. Note that, the utility of a worker depends only on the
salary and it is an increasing function. Let Af denote the set of workers who
make offer to the firm f .
Step 3. Each firm f accepts the offers of the workers that are in the
profit-maximizing set. Formally, firm f accepts the offers of the workers of
W f [sf (t)] where W f [sf (t)] maximizes pif (W, sf (t)) subject to |W | ≤ vf and
W ∈ Af .
Step 4. If the worker w’s offer is rejected by firm f in step t− 1, swf (t) =
swf (t− 1)− 1; otherwise swf (t) = swf (t− 1). Each worker keeps on making
offers to one of its utility maximizing firm and he can decrease his offer only
12
to σwf (the lowest salary that w would ever consider to work for firm f).
Step 5. The process stops when there is no rejection.
The worker-proposing salary adjustment process converges to an individu-
ally rational matching but it may not be stable. The example that illustrates
this case will be given at the end of the section.
Lemma 4. After a finite number of steps, the worker-proposing salary ad-
justment process stops.
Proof. By Step 3 of the worker-salary adjustment process, each firm f will
accept the offers of the workers that are in the profit maximizing subset of Af
and reject the other offers. The permitted salaries of the rejected workers will
fall by one. Since for all w ∈ W the lowest salary exists, the firm eventually
loses his offer. Thus, in some step there will be no rejection.
Lemma 5. The worker-proposing salary adjustment process converges to an
individually rational matching.
Proof. Let t∗ be the step at which the process stops and let µ be the matching
that it converges. Denote the set of workers that are assigned to firm f by
µ−1(f)
Claim. For any f ∈ F ∪ {∅} and for any w ∈ W with µ(w) = f :
uw(swf (t
∗)) ≥ uw(σwf )
Case 1. f ∈ F
By Step 1 and Step 4 of the worker-proposing salary adjustment process,
swf (t
∗) ≥ σwf . Since uw is strictly increasing, we have uw(swf (t∗)) ≥ uw(σwf ).
Case 2. f = ∅
Since the worker is unemployed, then he has zero salary, swf (t
∗) = 0
uw(swf (t
∗)) = uw(0) = uw(σwf ) which is the lowest utility.
Claim. For any f ∈ F : pif (W fµ , sf (t∗)) ≥ 0
By no free lunch assumption, pif (∅, sf (t∗)) = yf (∅) = 0. The claim is the
immediate result of Step 3 of worker-proposing salary adjustment process and
13
the fact that the firm is not required to hire any workers.
Here is the example in which the worker-proposing salary adjustment pro-
cess does not converge to a stable matching.
Example 1. W = {1, 2, 3} F = {F,D}
yD(1) = 3 yD(2) = 3 yD(3) = 1
yD(12) = 10 yD(13) = 8 yD(23) = 8 yD(123) = 12
yF (1) = 4 yF (2) = 5 yF (3) = 6
yF (12) = 10 yF (13) = 13 yF (23) = 15 yF (123) = 18
vD = 2 , vF = 1
∀f ∈ F , σwf = 0
δ1D = 7 , δ2D = 7 , δ3D = 5
δ1F = 7 , δ1F = 9 , δ1F = 10
The matching that the process converges is given by µ.
1 (s1µ(1)) 2 (s2µ(2)) 3(s3µ(3))
µ : D (2) F (3) D (5)
The profits of firms: piD({1, 3}, (2, 3, 5)) = 1 , piF (2, (2, 3, 4)) = 2
Now, consider the firm-set of workers pair (D, {1, 2}) and the salary vector
(3,4,5). Suppose that domestic firm hires worker 1 and worker 2 with salaries
3 and 4, respectively. Clearly, there is a rise in the utilities of workers 1 and
2. The new profit of domestic firm, piD({1, 2}, (3, 4, 5)) = 10 − 7 = 3, which
means there is also a rise in the profit of domestic firm. Thus, (D, {1, 2})
blocks µ. µ is not stable.
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CHAPTER 5
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT
One of the main goal of this study is how the wages of workers and the
profits of firms evolve upon increasing foreign firm activities which is cap-
tured by rising the number of foreign firm vacancy by one. The cause of
this increase may be legal changes, having new technology etc. Then, the
implications of the increasing foreign activities on wages and on profits will
be discussed by looking into the differences between the matching that the
firm-proposing salary adjustment process converges and the matching that
the firm-proposing salary adjustment process converges after increase. A re-
striction on production function is needed to have certain results.
Assumption E. For any f ∈ F and for any W,W ′ ⊆ W and for any
w ∈ W − (W ∪W ′):
yf (W ) ≥ yf (W ′)⇒ yf (W ∪ w) ≥ yf (W ′ ∪ w)
Adding same worker to both sets of worker does not change the ranking
of production between these two sets.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption E is satisfied. Then, if the foreign
firm increases the number of vacancies, each worker’s salary increases or does
not change.
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Proof. Let the first vacancy of foreign firms equals to the vF . Let µ be the
matching that the firm-proposing salary adjustment process converges and
µ−1(F ) = WF , µ−1(D) = WD and unemployed workers U =W− (WF ∪WD).
Denote the salary schedules with sF and sD. Now, suppose the foreign firm
increases the number of vacancies, i.e. vF +1. Assume that the new matching
is µ′ and µ′−1(F ) = W ′F , µ
′−1(D) = W ′D. New salary schedules are given by
rF and rD. Since the number of vacancies increases, W ′F −WF 6= ∅. Take
any w ∈ W ′F −WF .
Case 1. µ(w) = ∅
If in the first step, F makes an offer to w, then for all w′ ∈ W − {w},
µ′(w′) = µ(w′), rw′µ′(w′) = sw′µ(w′) and rwµ′(w) ≥ 0.
If F makes an offer to the worker of a domestic firm , w′, not to an
unemployed worker. There are two possibilities:
(1) w′ rejects the offer. It means that w′ accepts the offer of the
domestic firm. If in any period w′ accepts the offer of F , since w′ is assigned
to D at the end, sw′D ≤ rw′D. We mean the rejection of the domestic firm’s
offer increases the salary. Otherwise, sw′D = rw′D.
(2) w′ accepts the offer. It means that w′ rejects the offer of domestic
firm. Since w′ is assigned to D at the end, in any period w′ accepts the offer
of D. So, sw′D ≤ rw′D.
Case 2. µ(w) = D
If F does not make any offer to w in previous matching, the first step offer
of F is greater than the first step offer of D. In the end, swD ≤ rwF .
If F makes an offer to w in the previous matching, in any period both F
and D make an offer to w. Let t be the last period in which w rejects the
offer of F , i.e. swF (t) ≤ swD(t). In this new matching, the same point is
reached. Again, w accepts D but in this time, F able to increase the salary.
So, swD ≤ rwF . Therefore D starts to look for a new worker. There are two
possibilities:
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(1) D makes an offer to the worker that also takes an offer from F .
If the offer of D is accepted, it means the salary increases. If the offer of F
is accepted, it means the salary doesn’t change.
(2) D makes an offer to an unemployed worker, so the salary of the
worker will increase.
In conclusion, an unemployed worker is assigned to a firm. Thus, his
salary will be higher and the salaries of other workers will not be lower.
We must check the necessity of Assumption E. The following example
shows that in the absence of this assumption, there exists a worker whose
wage decreases in the case of an increase int he vacancy of foreign firm.
Example 2. We have three workers and two firms: foreign firm (F ) and do-
mestic firm (D). The lowest salary that any worker would ever consider
working for any firm is equal to one for all firms and workers. First, foreign
firm hires one worker. For the second matching, it hires two workers.
W = {1, 2, 3}
yD(1) = 2 yD(2) = 3 yD(3) = 4
yD(12) = 7 yD(13) = 5 yD(23) = 6 yD(123) = 8
yF (1) = 3 yF (2) = 4 yF (3) = 5
yF (12) = 8 yF (13) = 6 yF (23) = 7 yF (123) = 9




D = 1, v
2
F = 2 v
2
D = 1
We denote the first and second matching with µ1 and µ2, respectively.
The matchings that the firm-proposing salary adjustment process converges:
1 2 3
µ1 : ∅ D(1) F (2)
µ2 : F (1) F (1) D(1)
We write the wages of the each worker in brackets. As we can see above,
the third worker is assigned to foreign firm with the wage 2 in the first match-
ing. However, in the second matching he is assigned to domestic firm with
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the wage 1. The wage of the third worker decreases. So, we need Assumption
E to reach Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption E is satisfied.If the number of for-
eign firm vacancies increases, then the profit of the foreign firm increases but
the profit of the domestic firm decreases.
Proof. Let the first vacancy of foreign firms equals to the vF . Let µ be the
matching that the firm-proposing salary adjustment process converges and
µ−1(F ) = WF , µ−1(D) = WD. Now, suppose the foreign firm increases the
number of vacancies, i.e. vF + 1. Assume that the new matching is µ
′ and
µ′−1(F ) = W ′F , µ
′−1(D) = W ′D.
In the new matching, the foreign firm tries to hire the worker, w ∈ W−WF
which maximizes
yF (WF ∪ {w′})− yF (WF )− σw′F
with respect to w′.
Case 1. µ(w) = ∅
In this case, there will be no change in the profit of the domestic firm.
Case 2. µ(w) = D
In this case, D starts to look for a new worker. By Step 2 of the firm-
proposing salary adjustment process, the new set of workers give less profit
than the previous one.
In both situations, note that by the second step of the firm-proposing
salary adjustment process foreign firm solves its profit maximization problem.
Then any set of workers that has less than vF + 1 workers can never give
higher profit then W ′F . So, pi
F (W ′F ) ≥ piF (WF ). The profit of the foreign firm
increases.
Considering Proposition 2, an increase in the vacancy of foreign firm makes





This study explores the relation between increasing foreign firm activities
and the wages of workers and the profits of firms in the local country. While
doing this analysis, salary adjustment process of Kelso and Crawford (1982)
with capacity constraint of firms is used that is different from existing papers
in international economics. Furthermore, worker proposing version of salary
adjustment process is built. Stability is preserved under worker-proposing
salary adjustment process. However, firm-proposing salary adjustment pro-
cess converges to an individually rational matching but this matching may
not be stable.
In the context of theoretical framework, our analytical solutions document
two conclusions which are valid in the case that adding same worker to the
subsets of workers do not affect the ranking between these subsets from the
standpoint of each firm. First, increasing foreign firm activities, captured by
a rise in the number of foreign firm vacancies, causes an increase in the level
of wages. Second, these activities increase the profits of foreign firm while
reducing the profits of domestic firm.
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6.2 Future Work
Fair distribution of benefits from FDI is a big concern. It is widely known
and also our results show that FDI affects the wages of workers in a positive
way in the local country. However, it is criticized with giving rise to wage
inequality between workers. Some recent studies claim that FDI widens the
gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers. Skilled workers are
expected to benefit from FDI more than unskilled workers. Another result of
recent studies is that foreign firms pay higher wages than local firms. Skill
premium refers to former finding and foreign firm premium refers to the lat-
ter. Since the salary adjustment process allow us to study with heterogeneous
firms and workers, we can test the previous findings with it. In order to ex-
plore the wage inequality in the local country, workers need to be categorized
as skilled and unskilled workers.
Obviously, identifying the assumptions to have unique stable matching
and to make worker-proposing salary adjustment process converge to a sta-
ble matching are further studies. Another future work may be whether our
matching model constitutes a lattice structure or not. If it is not, under which
conditions is the lattice structure found?
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